The Future of Turkish-Egyptian Relations

Published by Today's Zaman, 20 July 2011

When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly urged Hosni Mubarak to give up power, I was one of those who expressed concern. At that moment, none of us knew what would happen next. From a Turkish perspective, countless efforts to develop stronger economic relations with Egypt were now in jeopardy. Not to mention, an unstable Egypt could create serious challenges for Turkey. But I was also glad that Erdoğan followed his conscience and took the risk. Eventually, it turned out that the Turkish government was betting on the right side.

However, in the months following Mubarak’s departure, the old regime stood fast with only minor cosmetic changes. Would Turkish siding with the protesting masses backfire when the dust settled and revolutionary zeal gave way to disappointment with the realities of a crumbling country?

After countless conversations with activists, lawyers, diplomats, bankers, businessmen and journalists in Egypt, I became convinced that far from damaging Turkish-Egyptian relations, there was a growing space for them to advance. In every interview I conducted about the future of Egypt, my respondents showed immense interest in Turkey. They wanted to know about Turkey, but not merely to see how the model could be copied to fit the Egyptian context. They were curious to learn how the Turkish economy had recovered from the disaster of 2001. They wanted to understand how democracy, human rights, army-civilian relations and civil society had evolved in Turkey.
This gives Turkey a genuine connection with the future of Egypt. For this reason the Turkish government should urgently invest in more official, civil society and academic exchanges with Egypt, and create funds to bolster ties through education and grassroots projects.

While the Egyptian economy is facing haunting structural challenges, the country’s political instability is scaring away many investors. However, Turkish businesses are steadily breaking into the barren and vast lands of the country. Take the Polaris Group, for example, led by the visionary Tunç Özkan. Özkan has opened the first industrial park in the country, built on 2 million square meters of land. His ethical stance and investment in corporate responsibility projects have not only spared him from the recent arrests of corrupt business persons, but also won him deep respect in Egypt.

Another Turk rocking the Cairo scene is the general manager of hotel Kempinski. In less than a year, Fuat Köroğlu has made his relatively small hotel a major hub for diplomats and the high-flying elite. In fact, during the uprisings, he remained in the hotel during the long nights of ambiguity and arbitrary violence raging outside. His staff adores him for being there for them.

Turkish business persons in Egypt rightfully think that the Egyptian army and the new government will do nothing to harm businesses and will only seek to attract more foreign investment from countries with a good rapport. Thus, we should see a speedy increase in the number of Turkish firms and talents in Egypt’s chaotic but potential market.

Turkey has the right ambassador in place for shifting gears in Egypt. In a recent reception at the Turkish House in Cairo, His Excellency Hüseyin Botsalı dazzled Egyptian officials and elites by joining the music group with his saz -- a traditional Turkish instrument. His reputation in Egypt makes him the envy of other foreign ambassadors. His diplomatic experience in hot spots such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq make him the perfect man for the job.

As American and European officials are given the cold shoulder and Western businesses keep their distance, Turkish officials and investors find open doors. Turkey must seize this opportunity. It is a win-win scenario for both Egypt and Turkey.

Is the Egyptian “Revolution” a Revolution?

Published by The Commentator, 19 July 2011

It is impossible to not be inspired and moved by the tremendous courage and will of Egyptian people, who have risked it all and against all the odds dethroned a modern day dictator.

Yet, as the dust is settling in Egypt, it is time to ask the hard questions about what has changed and what has not changed in Egypt.

Clearly, one of the key changes is the fear factor. Egypt was a police state under Mubarak and the permanent state of emergency granted limitless powers to security forces. Even the slightest expression of criticism or political opinion often resulted in indefinite detention, physical abuse and intimidation with no recourse to justice and no sense of rule of law.

In Tahrir square, Egyptians took away the most important tool the security forces had; their illusion of omnipotence and omniscience. Now, Egyptians speak freely and boldly about the problems of their country.


The other clear change is that the collapse of Mubarak and his political apparatus brought political and social, albeit limited, empowerment of Egyptian citizens, who now feel that they have a say in Egypt’s future. It is exciting to see dynamic and at times over-zealous and over-emotional activists finding their way through new openings. There are high hopes from upcoming elections and new political parties are founded almost every other week.

However, these are simply not enough to call the impeachment of Mubarak a ‘revolution’. Even though the word revolution is used metaphorically today for everything from emergence of tablet computers to the latest makeup line, revolutions where an old system is forcibly changed into a new system are not too common.

The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran was indeed a revolution, which changed the political and social topography of the country for good, but the so-called ‘Green Revolution’ in 2009-2010 Iran was not. It was an episode of unsuccessful uprisings.

So how about Egypt? There are legitimate reasons to think that while Mubarak and his top political, security and business partners have been forced out, the system that enabled and maintained his rule is still alive and kicking. Mubarak’s rule was not an ideological comradeship but a clientele and interest based power clique. Such things have their own life span outside of the person on the top of the pyramid. Thus, if it contradicts its own benefit the system will even sacrifice its head to be able to maintain its power.

In fact, the Egyptian Army has demonstrated this by dropping support of Mubarak in order to protect its own interests. The Army, which has always held the lion’s share of economy and power in the country, passed through the uprisings without a scratch. The notorious State Security Services has only changed its name and expelled a few minor officers, but kept its military core. Indefinite detentions, torture and unlawful imprisonment still continue and those asking for reform find themselves before military courts.

As new political actors are trying to learn politics and find support in an extremely chaotic political landscape, the Army keeps and will keep its power as it always has before. Parties, including those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, are already playing the game of abiding within the Army’s red lines and good will.

No single party government will emerge from the September elections and weak coalition governments will need the backing of the Army to survive. Thus, ultimately they will perform within the Army’s dictates.

Egyptian law and the judiciary remain in dire need of complete reform and modernization, yet no coherent project to do so seems to be on the horizon. The Egyptian economy is facing a complete breakdown, yet no political party is even putting forward economists or coherent economic visions to their shop front.

Many of them support unsustainable subsidies and populist policies of expanding employment in state sectors. Attacks on non-Muslims and non-orthodox Muslims such as Sufis continue with minimal interference and even known attackers still roam free. The Egyptian state continues to brush all of the ills under the carpet with cheap talks of brotherhood of Egyptians and feeble public gestures.

That is why Egyptians are still protesting in Tahrir square. Rightfully so! The system that was personified in Mubarak is still there and transformation of Egypt has only begun and a true revolution is still many miles ahead.

New Essay: Politics of Religious Minorities in Muslim-Majority States


Published by Review of Faith and International Affairs, Vol 9, No 2 (Summer 2011)


Without a doubt, the treatment of religious minorities in Muslim-majority states continues to be a major human rights concern. For some observers, ill-treatment of religious minorities is largely due to deeply-rooted theological reasons, if not inherent social attitudes. However, while it is impossible to deny that such factors lead to persecution of minorities, there is an often-overlooked variable in the picture, which is the socio-political context in which theological and social attitudes are legitimized or utilized. In fact, a brief look at history shows a dynamic pattern, rather than any essentialist doctrinal or attitudinal factor that somehow makes poor treatment of religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries inevitable.

A new political reality for Turkey

Published by Public Service Europe, 13 June 2011

This has been another fascinating election season in Turkey. Sex scandals, accusations of betrayal, corruption and threats of violence sprinkled with below-the-belt verbal attacks marked the low end of a maturing democracy in the country. Yet - fair and free elections, multiple parties and a long list of independent candidates and turnout above 80 per cent also signalled the undeniable strengths of Turkish democracy.

The outcome is dazzling. The ruling Justice and Development Party – or AKP - has won almost 50 per cent of the votes, a rare success. Before the elections, most observers predicted a minor drop in AKP votes - but still a clear victory somewhere between 39 and 45 per cent. This was primarily because of failed AKP initiatives on the Kurdish and Alevi issues as well as growing concern over freedom of expression - which have caused Kurds, Alevis and liberals to pull their support from the party.

Many believed the damage the sex tape scandals caused to the Nationalist Action Party - or MHP – would be as significant as the success of the main opposition Republican People's Party, also known as CHP. But MHP lost only 1 per cent from their vote share in 2007, still passing the 10 per cent threshold that parties need to enter the parliament. It actually achieved 13 per cent. This can be seen as a success, as MHP was widely expected to fall short of 10 per cent. But the biggest surprise was the low increase in CHP votes. While party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu worked extremely hard - breaking records in terms of the number of cities visited and rallies held by a politician - CHP only saw a 5 per cent increase from its 20 per cent share in 2007, significantly short of the projected 30 per cent.


The fourth party to enter the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party – or BDP. It received 6 per cent of the votes, up from 5 per cent in 2007. This increase means that the party will have 36 members of parliament, who are technically independent MPs, but in actuality a strong BDP block. The increase in seats from 22 seats in 2007, is good news as Kurdish concerns will have a significant presence in politics. The increase in the number of female MPs from 50 to 78, is also a promising development.

So is the outcome of the elections good or bad news? The answer to that is a wholehearted yes, it is great news. First of all, AKP is the right party to steer Turkey through the chaotic times - both in economic and foreign policy terms as well as the democratic reform process. It remains the only party that really is trying to adopt Turkey into the global realities and has enough brain power to pragmatically change its policies to adjust to ongoing problems in its neighbourhood.

Secondly, while AKP received 50 per cent of the votes - it has only been able to grab 326 seats in the parliament, which is short of the 330 seats needed to undertake constitutional changes without a referendum. Some 367 seats are needed for majority power. This means that while AKP will be able to continue its bold domestic and foreign policy agendas, it will need consensus and support from other parties. Therefore, while Turkey will continue to enjoy the stability that comes with a majority government, it will also benefit from political limitations faced by the government. In fact, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's victory speech after the elections has already marked a change in his tone towards conciliation.

Finally, the four parties in the new parliament - AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP - reflect the vast majority of Turkey's population; from conservatives to secularists, nationalists and Kurds. It is a remarkably healthy formation. The new parliament seems to be well balanced to face some serious issues that demand immediate actions. One day after the elections, the future of Turkey looks bright. And that is good news not only for Turkey, but for Europe as well.

Public Talk in June 2011: Turkey’s Elections: A Mandate for the AKP’s Bold New Middle East Policy?


9 June 2011, Committee Room 5, House of Commons, 6-7 PM
To attend please RSVP to: diana.murguia@henryjacksonsociety.org


In recent years Turkey had appeared to be making progress on the road to integration with Europe and the West. The country’s application for EU membership, wide ranging reform of its economic, social and political sectors, as well as increased engagement on a whole range of diplomatic issues, such as Cyprus, northern Iraq and the Middle East Peace Process. More recently however, serious questions have emerged over the direction of Turkish domestic and external policy under the Justice and Development Party, known as AKP and led by Prime Minister Erdogan with significant policy input from activist Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Arguably, the debates involved are at base symptomatic of the long-standing - foundational - Turkish struggle between the “Kemalist” ideals of a secular republican nationalism traditionally associated with the Army set against Turkey's Islamic identity, as represented by the current government - but other factors require examination also.

From its initial election in 2002, every move of Turkey's conservative AKP government has caused intense domestic and international speculation over its policy directions. Was Turkey becoming more Islamic? Or becoming true to the outlook of majority of its citizens? As the Turkish economy recorded rapid growth and Turkish foreign policy undertook a distinctly proactive turn to assert Turkish influence in the Middle East and North Africa, arguably at the cost of some of her NATO allies’ interests, the AKP has undertaken widely debated initiatives, making new allies and letting go of some old ones. Alas, the upcoming elections are deemed by many to be a watershed in determining future direction for Turkish politics. Whatever the outcome, Turkey will remain a key diplomatic and strategic player between the West and the Middle East, by virtue of its geographical location alone.

Coming just days before the upcoming Turkish elections, by kind invitation of Gisela Stuart MP, The Henry Jackson Society is pleased to be able to invite you to a discussion with Ziya Meral, an expert on Turkish politics and society and Researcher in Political Science at Cambridge University. Mr Meral will offer his views on the expected results of the upcoming elections and assess the likely implications for Turkish policy at this crucial juncture.

Turkish foreign policy and the New Middle East: alive and kicking

Published 26/5/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org



For some observers, the "Arab spring" burst the Turkish foreign policy bubble, exposing its true scope and lack of maturity. While Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan continued to captivate the Arab public across the region by publicly asking Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign, he seemed supportive of Syrian leader Bashar Assad and silent over serious human rights abuses unfolding in Syria and Bahrain.

On Libya, Erdogan went from categorically rejecting NATO involvement and condemning military action against his "Libyan brothers" to attempting to play a key role in the growing international tide against Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, seeking ties with rebels and signaling the need for Gaddafi to leave the country. This caused disillusionment in the streets of the Middle East as Turkey's behavior resembled that of a colonial power, using discourses of human rights and democracy whenever it suited its national interests.

Those ready to declare the end of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's energetic vision also pointed out that his catch phrase "zero conflict" had not achieved any results in the standoff between Armenia and Turkey nor brought the Cyprus problem any closer to resolution. Full European Union membership still looks far away. Israeli-Turkish relations are at a historic low and a return to the level of cooperation of the 1990s seems almost impossible. No one remembers Turkish efforts to settle disputes between Syria, Israel, Hamas and Fateh.

Public Statement: Escalating Violence in Egypt

Release Date: 16 May 2011

International experts and advocates warn of dangerous escalation of attacks on Christians in Egypt and failings of the international media in reporting the incidents accurately.

We, the undersigned group of experts, advocates and faith leaders with an interest in Egypt, religious freedom and human rights, are gravely concerned at the increasing frequency of attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt, and the manner in which such attacks are being reported by the international media.

We rejoiced at the determined yet dignified manner in which the Egyptian people asserted their right to enjoy fundamental freedoms. We were particularly encouraged by the solidarity and compatriotism demonstrated by all of the country’s creeds and political groups throughout demonstrations against the Mubarak regime. It was profoundly moving to see Muslims and Christians take turns in protecting one another while holding prayers in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

The collapse of the powerful state apparatus and the subsequent power vacuum this created, however, quickly opened a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of social problems that the Mubarak regime had either maintained or failed to address. As anticipated, we are now witnessing political struggles for power and influence in the new Egypt. While most of this is a necessary part of the emergence of true democracy in Egypt, the increase in and intensity of attacks on Christians are indicators of imminent civil unrest and the potential for widespread ethno-religious violence that demands an immediate response.


We are deeply concerned by the nature of these attacks on Christians, and the clear lack of action on the part of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. These attacks have been following established patterns. They have either been terrorist attacks, or well organized mob attacks by radical Islamist groups, referred to as Salafists, who are demanding Egypt become an Islamic state, free of Christians. Yet far from upholding the revolutionary spirit of unity we witnessed in January and February, the Armed Forces not only fail to provide adequate protection, but also continue to follow the policy of Mubarak’s regime by failing to uphold justice or arrest the real culprits, and by forcing reconciliation meetings on the victims that favor their attackers.

Both local and international media reporting of the attacks have been deeply problematic. Mainstream Egyptian media describes such incidents as communal clashes, with at times, inaccurate reports that they are incited by Coptic Christians. Some Islamic media uses harsher and more dangerous tone, with frequent calls to “punish” and ostracize the 10 million strong Coptic community.

The international media is reporting the attacks as “sectarian clashes”. However, these events are not clashes between two sects, such as Sunni and Shiite clashes in Iraq; they constitute a disturbing pattern of escalating attacks and violence against a minority community. Erroneous wording in media reports enable radical groups to continue their aggression, and the Egyptian authorities to remain oblivious and insensitive towards a vulnerable minority.

As we have seen in all cases of mass violence in the 20th Century, radical groups demanding a homogenized society, poor and compliant state performance and widespread scapegoating in media reports are all early indicators of ethnic violence, massacres and genocides.

Unless the international community shows strong resolve and tenacity in keeping the emerging Egyptian leadership accountable, millions of Egyptian citizens will continue to face escalating violence and serious human rights abuses. We urge the Egyptian authorities to uphold rule of law and show resolve in addressing the worrying trends, which have the potential to pull Egypt into further chaos.

Signatories:*

Ziya Meral; Joseph Crapa Fellow, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Dr Khataza Gondwe; Team Leader, Africa and the Middle East, Christian Solidarity Worldwide

Dr Jenny Taylor, Director, Lapido Media

Paul Marshall, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom

Nina Shea, Director, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom

Dr Elizabeth Iskander; Dinam Research Fellow, London School of Economics

Thomas F. Farr, Director, Religious Freedom Project- The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs

Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali, Oxford Centre for Training, Research, Advocacy & Dialogue

Dr Mariz Tadros, Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex

Adam Hug, Policy Director, the Foreign Policy Centre

Baroness Caroline Cox, CEO, Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust


*Disclaimer: This statement reflects the personal views of the signatories and not their affiliated organizations and institutions.

To contact the signatories and request more information on religious freedom in Egypt, please email: EgyptConcern@gmail.com

An Uncertain Future: Will uprisings change the religious persecution faced by Middle East's Christians?

Published in Sojourners Magazine, May 2011

This has been a difficult couple of years for Christians in the Middle East. There has been an increasing number of attacks on churches across the region, such as the attack on the al-Qiddisin Church in Alexandria, Egypt, on New Year’s Eve, which killed more than 20, and last November’s attack on Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad, which killed more than 50.<

But will the recent wave of social uprising, in which many examples of Muslim-Christian cooperation have been reported, change the political topography of the Middle East for the good? Will the political changes improve the situation of Christians in the region? A quick glance at the last 100 years -- and present-day trends -- does not offer a promising picture.

In the last century, Middle Eastern Christians have faced three major tidal waves of persecution. First, after World War I rearranged political boundaries, the nation-states in the region set out to form homogenized nations and authoritarian regimes. This proved fatal for many, including more than a million Armenians (whose ancestors were one of the first groups of people to become Christians), who experienced what is widely seen as a genocide under Ottoman rule.

In some countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, Christians eventually found opportunities to participate in the political and economic arenas, but in the 1960s a second wave of persecution emerged, which proved to be the start of large-scale exclusion of Christians in their homelands. Emerging political Islam and its appeal among disillusioned masses, which put immense pressure on ruling secular elites, also unleashed a twofold pressure on Christians. They continued to face pressure from their governments to assimilate or accept a rigidly circumscribed minority status, and now they also faced strong grassroots movements that demanded countries be based on the creeds of Islam. Thus, while in the early 20th century one could have been a Christian and a proud Egyptian, this second wave claimed that to be an Egyptian was to be a Muslim, and that non-Muslims were simply aliens.

The third wave of persecution Christians are facing in the region began with the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The prior two waves managed to exclude Christians from their societies and deny them almost all human rights under international law. The third wave has made them easy targets for militant groups; local Christians are now trapped by global fault lines entirely beyond their control.

Facing terrorist attacks, day-to-day denial of equal access to jobs, housing, education, and protection, and conspiracy theories blaming Christians for everything that is wrong in the Middle East, it is no surprise that Christians are fleeing the region in large numbers. If the trends continue, Christians will disappear from much of the Middle East within our lifetime.

How the current uprisings may affect this is uncertain, but one thing is clear: It is high time for the global church to speak up for their brothers and sisters -- by joining in the efforts of organizations that promote religious freedom, by partnering with the churches in the region, and by prayer. As their countries are going through dramatic changes, Christians in the Middle East, now more than ever, need to know that they are not alone and that they are not forgotten.