Leaving aside all of the conspiracy
theories and anxieties, the Gulen movement, also known as the Hizmet from the
Turkish word for service, is one of the most fascinating and out of the box
faith-based movements that have emerged from the Muslim world recently.
It is clear that the movement has come a
long way from its humble origins in Turkey as a local conservative Islamic
initiative to rejuvenate faith into a global network of schools, charities,
media outlets and businesses. Today, Turks inspired by the teachings of the
Turkish imam and scholar Fethullah Gulen can be seen setting up institutions,
organizations and companies in far flung corners of the world.
While most of what is written about the
movement remains retrospective and critical of its current status, in this
brief article I want to draw attention to few questions that need to be asked
in order to forecast the future of the movement.
First of these is what will happen when Mr
Gulen passes away? While he still accepts visitors, delivers talks, studies and
publishes, it is a well known fact that his health is weak and he does suffer
from the all too human limitation of being mortal.
The dynamic nature of the organization of
the movement means that even though there is an organic accountability
structure, local initiatives are independent in their day to day affairs. Thus,
Gulen’s death would not cause a stop or change in any of the movement’s
activities.
However, even though currently Gulen only
serves as a wise authority that countless bodies approach on issues of
disagreement and crisis rather than a CEO with executive powers, without him
the movement will lack a ‘plumb line’ that will keep it focused and united.
After Gulen, issues of dispute, difference
and conflict will be solved either through interpretation of his work or
through the intervention of key figures of the movement, thus opening the door
for non-conclusive tensions and debates on ‘what would Gulen do’. This will
inevitably create power-tensions and personality clashes among leaders of
various segments of the movement as well as different theological preferences.
The movement is now too large and diverse
in political, social and economic backgrounds for any voluntary network to
maintain coherence and without a spiritual guide that holds its vision
together, different voices and cohorts will inevitably pull charities and
organizations to different directions.
Will the movement’s Turkish nationalist and
liberal voices clash in their visions? Will the globally experienced
cosmopolitan affiliates find themselves at odds with Gulen followers in more
traditional Turkey? Will significant economic and social uplifting we see in
Hizmet circles open the door for resentment of its own privileged elites? In
other words, will we see multiple Hizmets?
While most of those who associate
themselves with Mr Gulen’s teaching are sincere folk who try do their best to
serve to humanity as Muslims, undeniably, it is now profitable to affiliate
with the movement for business and self-advancement purposes, thus not all who
join the ranks have clear pure motives. Therefore, as its reach and influence
continue to grow, will the movement be able to maintain its spiritual core
values or will it evolve into becoming nothing short of an Islamic equal of the
Rotary or Lions clubs?
The future of the movement also goes
through on how it will handle its roots and activities in Turkey. Will the
movement remain as a movement of Turks abroad or will it make the jump into
becoming a truly global movement that originated in Turkey but includes peoples
of all nations?
Thus far, vast majority of activities of
the movement can be seen as Turks carrying the Turkish flag and culture abroad
alongside its more universally appealing faith-inspired values. While the
movement is enculturating itself abroad through second and third generation
migrants and locals who studied in Hizmet schools, it is still dominated by
Turks, Turkish and Turkish culture.
Accusations of institutionalization in key
Turkish state structures continue to cast a cloudy shadow on the movement,
although a lot of this sort of thinking is exaggerated thanks to the annual
need in Turkey to find a domestic threat to nation’s secular existence.
Nevertheless, the initial know-how and survival strategies of the movement in
Turkey are increasingly stifling its global future. Will the movement be able
to put its Turkish home in order and move on from its old frameworks?
These are neither all of the questions that
need to be asked or a comprehensive list of things to watch out for.
Nevertheless, the answers researchers and affiliates of the movement might seek
to give to these questions will not only be vital in developing healthier
understanding of the movement but also similar new generation Islam inspired
civil movements that do not fit into any of traditional categories we ascribe
to them.
