Published by The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 05 May 2014
The relationship between Turkey and Egypt has rarely been
an easy one. During the British Mandate, the Turkish government found
itself clashing with Egyptian authorities over the rights and
entitlements of Turks living in Egypt. Then, of course, there was the
infamous 1932 incident in which Ataturk humiliated the Egyptian
ambassador at an official Turkish state reception by requiring that he
remove his fez; the traditional hat had been banned in Turkey as part of
Ataturk’s efforts to make Turkey become a “civilized, Western” country.
The 1952 revolution in Egypt brought no positive change to
this state of affairs. In one incident, the Turkish ambassador—whose
wife was an Egyptian with royal blood who had lost family assets after
the Free Officers took control—refused to shake Nasser’s hand at a
reception and insulted him publicly. Shortly thereafter, the ambassador
was sent back to Turkey, and Turkish – Egyptian relations remained in a
poor state for years afterwards. Turkish foreign policy, particularly
its engagement with Iraq and its Western orientation, regularly brought
both countries into collision as Nasser pursued his ambitious regional
projects: Turkey’s support for the British in the Suez Crisis attracted
Nasser’s anger, for example, while Nasser’s stances on Cyprus and Syria
caused serious concern in Ankara.
Interestingly, it was the Democratic Party government of
Adnan Menderes—a religious-conservative Prime Minister who was hanged
following a military coup and who serves as a frequent reference point
for Erdoğan—that pushed for more Turkish engagement with the countries
of the Middle East following decades of Turkish disengagement. Turkey’s
feeble attempts to unite and lead the Middle East clashed with the
foreign policy efforts of Nasser’s Egypt, and it was only after the 1960
military coup that ousted the Menderes government that Egypt and Turkey
began a normalization process.
As both countries went through turbulent times in the 1980s
and 1990s, the relationship between them remained weak both
economically and diplomatically. Both countries suffered from limited
knowledge of, and exposure to, the other. Egypt and Turkey also suffered
from being sidelined actors in a region dominated and shaped by others
even as they both maintained perceptions of power, influence, and
grandeur as the gateway to the Middle East. The number of people with
deep knowledge of Egypt in Turkey shrank considerably, and many of those
left were conservatives who had studied at Islamic institutions in
Egypt or were engaging directly with Islamist thought emerging from
Egypt.
Following the arrival of the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) into power, Turkey once again turned towards a region it had
tended to ignore. However, with relatively few academics, policy
experts, or diplomats who could speak Arabic or who maintained deep
roots in regional matters aside from Islamic theology and related
disciplines, Turkey once again set out on an overly ambitious course to
become a major player in a hotly contested region without the
institutional strength needed to sustain it.
At the same time, things were changing in Egypt, too. The
foundations of Egypt’s rentier economy was truly crumbling by the early
2000s, posing serious challenges to the Mubarak regime. Turkey’s
economy, meanwhile, showed growing strength, and Turkish firms, which
were increasingly turning toward the Middle East, discovered Egypt as a
potential venue for investment. Mubarak, who had shared his
predecessors’ dislike of Turkish ambitions, nevertheless took steps to
open Egypt’s economy for closer engagement with Turkey. According to the
Turkish Embassy in Cairo, there were 64 official visits
by Turkish delegations to Egypt and 29 Egyptian visits to Turkey
between 2003 and the first quarter of 2009. These included reciprocal
visits by President Gül and President Mubarak.
The outcome of these interactions can be seen in the free
trade agreement signed in 2005 (which came into force in 2007), the
extent of visa liberalization between the two countries, and ultimately,
the rapid increase in trade volume between two countries. In 2001,
Egyptian exports to Turkey stood at a minuscule $91 million, and Turkish
exports to Egypt amounted to $421 million; in 2004, Egyptian exports
had increased to $255 million, with Turkish exports growing to $473
million (indicating a total trade volume of $728 million).
From 2005 onwards, official records at the Turkish Statistical Institute show generally positive growth in total trade volume between the two countries:
This was welcome progress: both countries had recognized
the underdeveloped state of their relationship and the costs of the many
opportunities lost because of it. This was also why many observers,
myself included, were taken back when Erdoğan became one of the first
foreign leaders to publically ask Mubarak to step down in 2011. There
seemed to be both too much at stake for Turkish investments and no
reason to further increase the already-high foreign policy risks that
Turkey faced as its diplomatic hyperactivity ran headlong into complex
regional politics. Paradoxically, Turkey’s geo-economic interests grew
even as its geo-political maneuvering space shrank, and the idealism
that had animated Turkish foreign policy under Foreign Minister
Davutoğlu was being tested and forced to modify its ambitions.
Even so, the Turkish gamble paid off (at the time, at
least). Mubarak’s resignation and the first wave of changes in the
region opened new diplomatic opportunities for Turkey. In Egypt, one
could feel the breadth of positive feelings toward Turkey. The Turkish
research group TESEV’s survey of public attitudes
towards Turkey across the Middle East-North Africa region found that
86% of Egyptians had favorable views of Turkey in 2011, and 84% in 2012.
Thus, it was not surprising that when Erdoğan visited Egypt in 2011,
many thousands of people showed up to greet him. It was indeed a
remarkable moment, as a wide range of Egyptians, not just Islamists,
expressed interest in Turkey and the relationship between the two
countries. Often, when I tried to learn from Egyptian activists what was
happening in Egypt in 2011, questions about Turkey, its politics,
economy and social changes shifted the direction of the conversation.
This stood in contrast to other visits I have undertaken to Egypt since
2006, in which conversations about Turkey were limited to football or
light-hearted chats about culture and food.
In the interim period between Mubarak and Morsi, the
Turkish stance on Egypt was clear: whoever comes into power should
listen to democratic concerns, and Turkey would support any freely
elected Egyptian government. It was impossible for Turkey to predict
what might happen in Egypt or even to invest in particular political
candidates. Meanwhile, Turkey sought to protect its economic interests
amid worries from Turkish firms over the treatment of businessmen from
the Mubarak era and growing instability and other investment risks in
Egypt. One could sense the anxiety of those operating Turkish businesses
in Egypt, but the Turkish government was actively encouraging them to
stay in the country. Certainly, Turkish investments had a long-term
vision and direct engagement with Egyptian public. In Alexandria alone,
there were some 15 Turkish factories at the time employing anywhere from
600 to 4,000 Egyptians apiece. In fact, Turkish textile investors were
shutting down operations in Turkey in favor of opening facilities in
Egypt, taking advantage of lower labor costs and bringing to Egypt
modern manufacturing and technology.
With the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012,
however, Turkey found a government with which it could engage much more
closely. This, combined with developments in other countries in the
region, led Turkey to see a new range of opportunities open up
region-wide after it had increasingly found itself being limited by
prior developments in the region. Consequently, this is where the first
phase of Turkish engagement with Arab Spring, one based on worthy
principles, gave way to the second phase, which consisted of new
pursuits with potential political allies who had shared some elements of
AKP’s Islamist roots.
However rosy this new era might have appeared at the time,
it was about to turn truly difficult and highly costly for Turkey. While
the AKP government might have seen the emerging Muslim Brotherhood
presence in the region as a friendly development, the Brotherhood was
never that keen on the AKP and its “Islamist” credentials. In fact,
sources in Ankara have told of how they had warned Morsi on his policies
and urged him to focus on the economy and reform in order to preclude
any possible coup, advice that Morsi shrugged off regularly. In various
conversations that I had in Egypt, it was clear that while Turkey was
seen as a friendly ally, there were quite a number of voices in the
Muslim Brotherhood that also saw Turkey as too ambitious and not closely
aligned with their ideals and visions.
If Erdoğan’s risky choice to ask Mubarak to stand down was a
surprise, his strong stance against the widely supported military coup
that ousted Morsi was not. He personally knew Morsi and his government
members, and religious conservatives in Turkish politics had suffered
tremendously from similar military interventions; discussions of the
coup that resulted in the execution of conservative Prime Minister
Menderes were frequently encountered around this time. Indeed, not just
Erdoğan but his entire constituency saw a worrying reflection of their
own past in the suffering of Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt; this
struck a deep chord in AKP supporters which was only amplified as
widespread protests against Erdoğan broke out in Turkey. Once again,
fears grew among Turkish conservatives of attempts to topple an elected
government that they favored, a development that would have taken back
all of the openings they had enjoyed since the AKP came to power.
Sadly, strong outbursts in Turkey condemning the
developments in Egypt quickly overwhelmed all of the effort expended to
forge closer bonds between Turkey and Egypt since the early 2000s, and
these outbursts caused the popular perception of Turkey in Egypt to
deteriorate dramatically. Many saw Turkey as simply a foreign supporter
of Muslim Brotherhood that desired an Islamist takeover of Egypt. The
same TESEV study that had recorded more than 80% popularity ratings for
Turkey in Egypt in 2011 and 2012 indicated an approval rating of just
38% in 2013. Ironically, Erdoğan had gotten into trouble with Muslim
Brotherhood not two years prior for publicly saying that Egypt should
have a secular constitution and state, and he had regularly warned Morsi
in person not to prioritize Islamist policies but instead to focus
elsewhere.
As Egyptians began reacting to Turkish statements and
actions with a similar intensity of feeling, a new interpretation of
developments in Egypt, filtered through prior Turkish experiences,
emerged in Turkey. The use of this new interpretation by the Turkish
opposition to corner the AKP’s foreign policy and redefine its political
identity turned Egyptian politics into a Turkish domestic
issue—Egyptian developments were adapted as means of expressing Turkish
concerns about Turkey.
It was within this environment of intense feelings on both
sides and amplified public displays of diplomacy that a fascinating
story unfolded. At the time, the Turkish ambassador to Cairo, Avni
Botsalı, had already been appointed to his next post and was going
through his official departure process. He had been a remarkable
ambassador who maintained truly deep and effective relationships all
across the Egyptian establishment. He had also, however, attracted a
peculiar kind of criticism in some Turkish circles who were asking for
the appointment of a more conservative ambassador after Morsi took
office. When Morsi was ousted, Botsalı had already been scheduled to
leave Egypt. However, Egyptian diplomats and statesmen demanded that he
stay in Cairo because they trusted him; ultimately, Ankara took the wise
decision to keep him in his post. One Egyptian diplomat told me: “We
said to Ankara, we don’t want to talk to any other ambassador.”
Botsalı’s skill as a bridge between Cairo and Ankara during these
turbulent times has been exemplary. Thus, when he was later declared
persona non grata by the Egypt government, it was a loss felt deeply in
both cities.
This story, among other events, shows how both countries
have gone wrong in understanding and handling each other. It is also
clear how misperceptions and overly emotional response patterns have
caused public views in both countries to fall under the sway of strong,
yet generally unfounded, prejudices. However, beyond the public
political clashes, both countries’ diplomatic structures had clearly
developed better mutual understanding, revealing how Egypt and Turkey
could have better navigated the current storm and how they can yet find a
way out of the current downturn in relations.
The hope for re-normalization lies in a simple fact that
this brief article has tried to demonstrate: Turkey and Egypt did not
discover each other only after the election of President Morsi—positive
relations between the two countries did not develop just as part of some
putative Sunni Islamist plot to redesign the Middle East, as some might
argue. Closer relations began in the Mubarak era for extremely
important reasons: both countries’ economies have so much to gain from a
friendly relationship, and positive relations between Egypt and Turkey
would have significant, mutually beneficial regional implications.
The challenges that are ahead now are to rediscover these
truths (even as both countries continue to go through domestic
uncertainties) and to help members of both societies to understand the
other beyond the level of sharp, emotive responses (which Egyptians and
Turks share as a common trait). Turkey and Egypt must learn both how to
work with each other on issues of economic and political importance and
how to constructively engage each other when disagreements and concerns
arise. Achieving this kind of relationship is vital because, in the end,
Turkey is more important to Egypt (particularly to its future as a
healthy society, economy and regional actor) and Egypt is more important
to Turkey (particularly regarding its regional interests) than the
current, angry outbursts between the two countries suggest.
